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 Despite the nationwide availability of cheap consumer 
products and services in the marketplace, consumers lacked an 
inexpensive and suitable forum in which to bring small claims. 
Beginning in the latter part of the twentieth century, these claims 
found a home in federal class action, governed by Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure (FRCP or Rule) 23. Class action litigation was 
designed to provide an efficient mechanism for multiple claims with 
common questions of law or fact to be brought as a single litigation 
unit. Subsection (b)(3) of Rule 23 permits consumers who have 
suffered relatively minor harms to bring their claims en masse, greatly 
defraying the cost of litigation.  
                                                 
 Juris Doctor, May 2014, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; Executive Articles Editor, CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW, 2013–2014; 
B.A., Political Science and History, Miami University, 2007. I would like to thank 
Professor Hal Morris for his guidance and support. I would also like to thank my 
parents, George and Cynthia Pauwels, for their unyielding encouragement. 
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 Basic economic principles dictate that potential plaintiffs who 
suffer monetary harm are unlikely to sue when the cost of litigating 
would result in nothing more than a pyrrhic victory. This economic 
disincentive is heightened when only de minimus monetary harms are 
at stake. An example of this type of class action claim comes from the 
District Court for the District of New Jersey. In Katz v. Live Nation 
Inc., Live Nation customers filed a class action suit against the 
company for charging a mandatory six-dollar parking fee for each 
ticket, regardless of whether a ticket buyer drove to the venue.1 These 
fees, when considered individually, were far too small to justify an 
individual bringing a lawsuit to vindicate his rights, but represented a 
large source of revenue for Live Nation, which benefited not from the 
size of the fee, but rather from the number of consumers charged.2  
 Commentators have viewed recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence as tightening the requirements to survive class 
certification3––yet another move by a business-friendly court to curb 
consumer protections.4 One Supreme Court decision, Comcast v. 
Behrend,5 has sparked controversy in the realm of class action 
litigation by refining the predominance rules around damage classes.6  
                                                 
 1 Katz, et al. v. Live Nation Inc., No. 09–3740 (MLC), 2010 WL 2539686, at 
*1 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2010). The case settled in 2014 for: (1) three (3) free lawn tickets 
to a Free Ticket Event, as described in sub-section 6(a) below; and (2) a coupon code 
for a five dollar ($5.00) discount on ticket purchases. Amended Class Settlement 
Agreement And Release, 12, ECF. No. 85-1.  
 2 Amended Class Settlement Agreement And Release 8, ECF. No. 85-1 (noting 
there are 362,928 class members).  
 3 Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 
(2013). 
 4 Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
(May 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-
decisions-are-defining-this-supreme-court.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; 
Corporations and the Court, THE ECONOMIST, (June 23, 2011),  
www.economist.com/node/18866873; Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard 
Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431 (2013).  
 5 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
 6 Damages classes are those classes that seek classwide damages in addition to 
the other common questions of law or fact that the class has been organized for.  
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 This Note’s purpose is to look at how the Seventh Circuit has 
approached predominance7 through the lens of Butler v. Sears, 
Roebuck, and Co. II8 (Sears II) following the Supreme Court’s 
decision to vacate and remand Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. I.9 
Three questions will direct this discussion: How did the Seventh 
Circuit apply the Court’s analysis to the facts of Sears II? Did the 
Seventh Circuit correctly interpret the majority decision to only apply 
to classes seeking classwide damages, or were they incorrectly swayed 
by Justice Ginsburg’s dissent? To what extent are the circuit courts 
divided on how to apply Comcast? 
 Part I of the note will provide background information on class 
actions generally, including a brief review of the development of the 
predominance requirement. Part I will also provide the facts of Sears 
II and, the case’s procedural history through the federal court system. 
Part II will review the analysis the Seventh Circuit used in its Sears II 
decision and discuss whether the court correctly interpreted Comcast 
in light of Sears II’s facts. Part III will look beyond the Seventh 
Circuit to the other circuits that have had the opportunity to review 
predominance in light of Comcast and consider whether, and to what 
degree, those courts agree with the Seventh Circuit. Part III will also 
look to how the district courts sitting within the Seventh Circuit have 
analyzed predominance. Finally, Part IV will offer my conclusions on 
the Seventh Circuit’s Comcast application and its implications for the 




                                                 
 7 The predominance inquiry found in Rule 23(b)(3) asks whether individual 
questions of fact or law will “overwhelm questions common to the class.” Comcast 
v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013). Where “proposed classes are sufficiently 
cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation,” the predominance test is 
satisfied and class certification should be granted. Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).  
 8 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 9 702 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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 While the introductory paragraphs have discussed the basic 
reasons for having the class mechanism built into the federal rules, a 
more thorough discussion of the development of class actions and their 
current role will help frame the later conversation. 
 
A. The development of Rule 23 and class action jurisprudence  (1938 – 
present) 
 
 Rule 23 is a deviation from the general rule that litigation must 
be “conducted by and on behalf of the named parties only.”10 While 
class actions were included in the original 1938 Federal Rules, the 
class action framework we know today is the result of “a bold and 
well-intentioned [revision in 1966 designed] to encourage more 
frequent use of class actions.”11 While the revisions did not initially 
spur a spate of collective litigation, the courts eventually took a liking 
to the tool in the mid-1980s when forced to respond to “dockets 
clogged with mass tort cases.”12  
 For the next fifteen to twenty years, class actions became a 
popular method for trying common claims. Two major factors created 
the conditions for Rule 23’s booming acceptance. First, high paydays 
encouraged plaintiffs’ attorneys to seek out potential class 
representative plaintiffs.13 Second, the high stakes of class litigation 
forced defendants to settle rather than “risk a potentially bankrupting 
judgment” at trial.14 The impulse to settle was strengthened by the lack 
of interlocutory review, now permitted under Rule 23(f), which forced 
                                                 
 10 Walmart v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (quoting Califano v. 
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)). 
 11 Charles A. Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 170 (1970). 
 12 Klonoff, supra note 3, at 736. 
 13 Id. at 737–38. 
 14 Id. 
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defendants to wait until final judgment to challenge class 
certification.15 
 Class action plaintiffs in recent years have suffered setbacks in 
Congress, with the Class Action Fairness Act, and with recent 
decisions in the United States Supreme Court. In 2005, Congress 
enacted the Class Action Fairness Act.16 The Act had two goals: 
reduce forum shopping by expanding the diversity jurisdiction rules to 
permit cases with minimum diversity17 where the collective amount in 
controversy exceeds five million dollars; and enhance review of class 
action settlements for fairness.18 The Act was intended to sweep truly 
national class actions into the federal courts, while preserving the state 
courts for disputes of a more local character under the “home state 
exception.”19 Congress believed plaintiffs were filing lawsuits in state 
courts known to be unfriendly for defendants and escaping removal by 
including non-diverse parties in the suits.20 While having the added 
benefit of helping defendant corporations that preferred a federal 
                                                 
 15 Id. Rule 23(f) reads: “APPEALS. A court of appeals may permit an appeal 
from an order granting or denying class-action certification under this rule if a 
petition for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 14 days after 
the order is entered. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless 
the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.” 
 16 Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4-14 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–
1715). 
 17 Minimum diversity exists where at least one defendant is diverse from at 
least one plaintiff. It stands in contrast to the general diversity rule, 28 U.S.C. § 
1332, which requires that no plaintiff be from the same state as any defendant.  
 18 Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 19 Jeffrey Roether, Interpreting Congressional Silence: CAFA's Jurisdictional 
Burden Of Proof In Post-Removal Remand Proceedings, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2745, 
2760–61 (2007). 
 20 The Class Action Fariness Act, Five Years Later, (April 12, 2010), 
www.mayerbrown.com/news/the-class-action-fariness-act-five-years-later-04-12-
2010/. Essentially, plaintiffs’ attorneys would add non-diverse class representatives, 
simply to eliminate complete diversity, a death-knell to diversity jurisdiction in 
federal court at the time. By adding a non-diverse class representative or defendant 
to the mix, the class could proceed in state court without fear of removal to federal 
court, which lacked subject matter jurisdiction without complete diversity. 
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forum, the main goal of the Class Action Fairness Act was to prevent 
these forum selection abuses.21 On the whole, the Act has been 
successful at driving large class actions into federal forums, though 
forum shopping now takes place among the federal district courts 
rather than among the states.22 
 Recent Supreme Court decisions have further curtailed class 
plaintiffs’ choices to bring their suits and obtain class certification. 
Commenters point to five recent Supreme Court decisions––each 
decided by a bare 5-4 majority with the same five justices in the 
majority––that have fundamentally reshaped how class actions work in 
the federal system.23 Through these five rulings, Stolt-Nelson, S.A. v. 
Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, Wal-
Mart v. Dukes, Genesis Healthcare Corp v. Symczyk, and Comcast 
Corp v. Behrend, the Court restricted class actions for claims rooted in 
consumer contracts, employment contracts, and employment 
discrimination; permitted defendants to offer settlements to individual 
plaintiffs;24 and allowed for closer scrutiny of proposed classes before 
certification.25 One case stands in contrast to these five in its ruling for 
the plaintiffs seeking class certification: Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut 
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, where the court refused to expand 
the amount of proof required to achieve class certification in securities 
fraud claims based on the “fraud on the market” theory.26 
 With this backdrop in mind, the next subsection will review the 





                                                 
 21 Id. See also, S. REP. NO. 109-14 at 10–27 (2005).  
 22 Id. 
 23 See, e.g., John Campbell, Unprotected Class: Five Decisions, Five Justices, 
and Wholesale Changes to Class Action Law, 13 WYO. L. REV. 463, 465 (2013). 
 24 Potentially destroying class certification by eliminating numerosity. 
 25 Id.  
 26 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
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B. Class certification requirements under Rule 23 
 
 In a Rule 23 evaluation, the court looks at several criteria to 
determine the worthiness of a class for certification. The threshold 
inquiry under Rule 23(a) depends on four elements: numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.27 These 
elements require the plaintiff to show that there are enough potential 
class members to warrant class certification, that there is a common 
question of law or fact among the parties, that the claims of the named 
plaintiff are typical of the rest of the class, and that the class counsel 
will adequately represent the interests of the class.28 Once these 
elements have been satisfied, the class must fit into one of the three 
categories permitted under Rule 23(b). Subsection (b)(1), or limited 
fund classes are where the total amount of damages for all potential 
plaintiffs would exceed the defendant’s assets, thus creating 
inconsistent standards of conduct for the defendant or affecting the 
rights of other plaintiffs not parties to the individual suit.29 Subsection 
(b)(2) classes are where the defendant’s conduct applies generally to 
the class, so that injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate for the 
whole class.30 Finally, subsection (b)(3) classes are where there are 
common questions of law or fact that predominate over individual 
issues such that class certification is “superior” to individual 
litigation.31  
 This comment will focus on the 23(b)(3) classification and 
specifically the predominance requirement therein. Predominance is a 
question of efficiency.32 The purpose of the predominance requirement 
is to make sure that the common questions of either law or fact are 
central to the issue of liability before the court. Where efficiency is the 
goal of the predominance test, common questions that only address 
                                                 
 27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 
 28 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997). 
 29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). 
 30 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2013). 
 31 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
 32 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615–16. 
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ancillary or tangential issues of the litigation do not satisfy 
predominance because the cost and complexities of class litigation far 
outweigh the benefits obtained through combined litigation of 
common issues. For class litigation to be efficient, the common issues 
must move litigation far enough ahead such that only relatively minor 
individual issues remain. 
 Thus, the predominance requirement is not fulfilled where 
“individual questions . . . overwhelm questions common to the 
class.”33 On the contrary, if common issues predominate, the 
requirement is fulfilled and class certification can proceed. Where 
there are only common questions among the class or there are no 
common questions among the class, no in-depth predominance 
analysis need be done.34 In cases where both common and individual 
questions must be resolved, the court must consider several factors at 
the subjective discretion of the district court.35  
 Three recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have looked 
toward the predominance requirement in Rule 23; this Note’s purpose 
is to review how the Seventh Circuit has approached predominance 
through the lens of Sears II,36 following the Supreme Court’s decision 
to vacate and remand Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. I.37 The Court 
ordered the Seventh Circuit to reconsider the case in light of the 
Court’s ruling in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,38 where the Court held 
that “a damages suit cannot be certified to proceed as a class action 
unless the damages sought are the result of the classwide injury that 
the suit alleges.”39  
 
 
                                                 
 33 Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 
1184, 1193 (2013).  
 34 Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. I, 702 F.3d 259, 361 (7th Cir. 2012) 
vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2768 (mem.) (2013). 
 35 Id. 
 36 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 37 702 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 38 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
 39 Sears II, 727 F.3d at 799. 
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C. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend and the effect on predominance 
 
 A group of plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging various antitrust violations 
against Comcast Corporation for using a monopoly to charge supra-
competitive prices on cables services in certain markets.40 The district 
court granted class certification despite dismissing three of the four 
antitrust claims as incapable of classwide proof.41 The court found that 
Comcast’s activities created an impermissibly high barrier for new 
entrants into the affected markets and recognized that the plaintiffs’ 
damages model was sufficient to measure the relief of the remaining 
theory of liability.42  
 The Third Circuit, in a divided opinion, affirmed the findings 
of the district court; Comcast filed and was granted certiorari in the 
Supreme Court.43 
 
1. Justice Scalia delivers the opinion for the Court 
 
 Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion for the Court and 
initially noted the necessity of the reviewing court to look beyond the 
pleadings to the underlying facts of the case because “class 
determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in 
the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of 
action.”44 Further, the Court notes that “addition[al] safeguards for 
(b)(3) class members beyond those provided for (b)(1) and (b)(2),” 
including the ability to opt-out of class litigation, indicate that courts 
must take a more in-depth look at the predominance question before 
certification is granted.45 
                                                 
 40 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 1431. 
 43 Id. at 1431. 
 44 Id. at 1432 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. 
Ct. 2541, 2551-52 (2011)).  
 45 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432. 
9
Pauwels: Laundry and Cable Television: How the Seventh Circuit Preserved C
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014




 With those concepts in mind, the Court proceeded to look at 
whether the district court properly granted class certification despite 
relying on a damages model that relied on all four theories of relief, 
rather than requiring the plaintiffs’ expert to tailor the damages model 
to the remaining antitrust theory.46 Based on testimony of plaintiffs’ 
expert at a hearing in the trial court, the Court found that plaintiffs had 
not shown that the plaintiffs’ damages model was capable of proving 
that damages are able to be calculated.47 Thus, plaintiffs would have to 
prove damages individually, destroying predominance of common 
questions.48  
 Justice Scalia focused on the failure of the Third Circuit to 
look into the merits of the case to determine the worthiness of the case 
for class certification.49 Justice Scalia wrote: 
  
The District Court and the Court of Appeals saw no 
need for respondents to “tie each theory of antitrust 
impact” to a calculation of damages. [Behrend v. 
Comcast Corp.] 655 F.3d [182] at 206 [(3d Cir. 2011)]. 
That, they said, would involve consideration of the 
“merits” having “no place in the class certification 
inquiry.” Id. at 206-207. That reasoning flatly 
contradicts our cases requiring a determination that 
Rule 23 is satisfied, even when that requires inquiry 
                                                 
 46 Id. at 1433. 
 47 Id. at 1434. 
 48 Id. at 1434–35. SCOTUSblog commentator Sergio Campos frames the issue 
as whether the claims are susceptible to common answers or whether common 
questions are all that are necessary for class certification. Sergio Campos, Opinion 
analysis: No common ground, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 29, 2013, 4:30 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/opinion-analysis-no-common-ground. His 
analysis relies on Amgen and Wal-Mart as proof of an on-going divide on the Court 
as to what a plaintiff must prove to succeed on the question of predominance. Id. The 
issue of whether a divide exists and, if so, which side is correct is not the subject of 
this paper; the analysis moving forward accepts the majority decision in each case as 
the rule of law. 
 49 Comcast, 144 S. Ct. at 1433.  
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into the merits of the claim. Wal-Mart [Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2564 n.6 (2011).]50 
 
Proceeding from the determination that the courts below had failed to 
apply the correct depth of inquiry into the predominance question, the 
Court applied the correct method and determined that “[t]here is no 
question that the model failed to measure damages resulting from the 
particular antitrust injury on which petitioners’ liability in this action is 
premised.51  
 The failure, according to the Court, existed in the incongruity 
between the claims that survived Comcast’s motion to dismiss and the 
plaintiffs’ proposed method for calculating damages.52 While the 
Third Circuit waived off Comcast’s concerns of incongruity, reasoning 
that the damages model was not flawed at all,53 the Court looked to the 
three remaining theories of liability the district court rejected, and 
posited that those alternate theories may be the cause of the increased 





                                                 
 50 Id. 1433.  
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 1434. The incongruity exists because the damages model was based on 
all four causes of action the plaintiffs initially alleged. Justice Scalia relied on the 
failure of the plaintiffs to adjust the damages model to fit the remaining cause of 
action as indication that the Plaintiffs could not show that the remaining cause of 
action resulted in an increase in cable rates.  
 53 Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The 
[damages model was] not intended to calculate damages, but instead to construct an 
estimated competitive “but-for” Philadelphia market (a market absent the alleged 
anticompetitive market). . . . In other words, the model calculates supra-competitive 
prices regardless of the type of anticompetitive conduct.”). 
 54 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1434–1435 (“The permutations involving four 
theories of liability and 2 million subscribers located in 16 counties are nearly 
endless.”). 
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2. Justice Ginsburg pens a sharp dissent, joined by Justices 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagen 
 
 Justice Ginsburg began the Rule 23 discussion in her dissent by 
dismissing the possibility that the majority opinion should be read as 
breaking new ground on the predominance question.55 Nonetheless, 
Justice Ginsburg did not quibble with the majority’s conclusion that 
the “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual members.”56  
 The dissent took issue with the idea that damages stemming 
from a classwide injury must be measurable on a classwide basis.57 
The dissent pointed to a long line of cases that stand for the 
proposition that “individual damages calculations do not preclude 
class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).”58 Most notably, the dissent 
pointed to Amchem Products v. Windsor, decided only sixteen years 
earlier, where the Court held exactly the opposite of the majority’s 
ruling in Comcast.59  
 To distinguish this case from the typical antitrust 
predominance issue, the dissent pointed to the unique procedural 
posture of the case. Here, the case was originally granted certiorari on 
the question of “[w]hether a district court may certify a class action 
without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible 
evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is 
susceptible to awarding damages on a classwide basis.”60 Based on 
this question, the parties’ briefing and oral arguments focused on the 
admissibility of expert testimony – a question that was not addressed 
in the majority’s opinion.61 
                                                 
 55 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 56 Id. 
 57 Id.  
 58 Id. at 1437 (citing a “legion” of appellate court decisions). 
 59 Id. (“Predominance is a test readily met in actions alleging violations of the 
antitrust laws.”) (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 
(1997)). 
 60 Id. at 1435.  
 61 Id. at 1435–36. 
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 The majority, instead, rephrased the question as to whether 
certification was proper where the plaintiffs had failed to establish 
damages could be measured on a classwide basis.62 This, the dissent 
noted, is “both unwise and unfair” because the respondents could not 
“train their energies” on the separate issue of whether they had 
satisfied the predominance requirement with their expert testimony.63  
 
 
3. The take-away: what does the decision mean for the future 
of the ability for classes to gain certification without the ability 
to prove classwide damages? 
 
 What the district and circuit courts should take away from this 
opinion is not quite clear. The majority’s opinion focuses on the lower 
courts’ failing to inquire deeply enough into the merits of the damages 
model, which the Court found to be legally insufficient to determine 
classwide damages.64 But the dissent correctly identified a reluctance, 
at least at the circuit court level, to deny class certification where 
individual damages calculation is necessary, particularly in the 
antitrust context.65  
 A fair reading of the case points to the need for district courts 
to conduct a “rigorous analysis that the prerequisites” of Rule 23 have 
been satisfied.66 Thus, district courts should not hesitate to look 
beyond the pleadings to the merits, where doing so is necessary to 
determine whether class certification should be granted. As Justice 
Scalia notes, granting of class certification is a departure from the 
                                                 
 62 Id. at 1431, n.4 (majority opinion). 
 63 Id. at 1436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 64 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432–33 (majority opinion). 
 65 Id. at 1437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen adjudication of questions of 
liability common to the class will achieve economies of time and expense, the 
predominance standard is generally satisfied even if damages are not provable in the 
aggregate . . . [p]redominance is a test readily met in actions alleging violations of 
the antitrust laws.”) (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 
(1997)).  
 66 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432 (majority opinion).  
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ordinary structure of civil litigation, and thus requires an “affirmative 
demonstrat[ion]” of worthiness.67 
 The real question that arises is not whether courts need to look 
beyond the pleadings, but what kind of proof is required to 
demonstrate predominance. The Court makes clear that if a damages 
model is not reflective of the theories of liability and the relief sought, 
the model is an insufficient basis for Rule 23(b)(3) class 
certification.68 The issue, though, is that the Court did not explicitly 
overturn Amchem or the generally accepted notion that individual 
determinations of damages do not foreclose the possibility of class 
certification.69  
  Various lower courts have addressed the issue head-on 
including the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits 
since the Court handed down its decision in March 2013. The Seventh 
Circuit also addressed this issue in Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co. II, 
when the Court remanded Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co. I for 
reconsideration in light of Comcast Corp. v. Behrend.70  
                                                 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 1433. 
 69 See Advisory Committee’s 1996 Notes on Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 28 U.S.C.App. 
141; 7AA Wright, Miller & Kane Federal Practice and Procedure § 1781, 235–37; 2 
W. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:54, 205 (5th ed. 2012) (ordinarily, 
“individual damage[s] calculations should not scuttle class certification under Rule 
23(b)(3)”). Legions of appellate decisions across a range of substantive claims are 
illustrative. See, e.g., Tardiff v. Knox County, 365 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (Fourth 
Amendment); Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 273 (3d Cir. 2004) (Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act); Bertulli v. Independent Assn. of Continental Pilots, 242 F.3d 290, 
298 (5th Cir. 2001) (Labor–Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and Railway 
Labor Act); Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 564–566 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(Federal Communications Act); Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 801 (7th Cir. 
2008) (Eighth Amendment). Antitrust cases, which typically involve common 
allegations of antitrust violation, antitrust impact, and the fact of damages, are classic 
examples. See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d 124, 
139–140 (2d Cir. 2001). See also 2A P. Areeda, H. Hovenkamp, R. Blair, & C. 
Durrance, Antitrust Law ¶ 331, 56 (3d ed. 2007); 6 A. Conte & H. Newberg, 
Newberg on Class Actions § 18:27, 91 (4th ed. 2002). 
 70 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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PART II. BUTLER V. SEARS, ROEBUCK, AND COMPANY AND HOW THE 
CASE CAME TO PROMINENCE 
 
A. The plaintiffs file suit and seek class certification 
 
 Class representatives Susan Munch, Larry Butler, Joseph 
Leonard, and Victor Matos originally filed suit in December 2006 
against Sears, Roebuck, and Co. [“Sears”] on behalf of similarly 
situated purchasers of various Kenmore Elite high-efficiency washing 
machines.71 The named representatives alleged various claims 
including violation of state consumer protection laws, common law 
fraud, and breach of implied warranty of merchantability.72 Their 
complaint alleged that each plaintiff had purchased a Kenmore 
washing machine in 2004 or 2005 and had, in short order, began 
experiencing mechanical issues, mechanical failure, clothes not being 
cleaned, stains occurring during the washing process, and mold and 
mildew growing inside the machines.73  
 After the initial causes of action were dismissed, the plaintiffs 
amended their complaint to allege two major defects: electronic 
control board failure and water drainage failure. Sears again moved to 
dismiss in November 2007.74 Plaintiffs realleged the state consumer 
fraud claims, an unjust enrichment claim, and sought declaratory relief 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.75 The court 
again dismissed the state consumer fraud act claims, the unjust 
enrichment claim, and the § 2201 claim as to marketing and unlawful 
gains from extended warranties, but denied dismissal for the § 2201 
claim for failure to honor its two-year warranty.76  
                                                 
 71 Munch v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 2007 WL 2461660 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 72 Id. at 1. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Munch v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., Nos. 06 C 7023, 07 C 412, 2008 WL 
4450307, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
 75 Id.  
 76 Id. 
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 The final version of the complaint alleged breach of warranty 
for two separate classes of plaintiffs: those whose machines suffered 
from the mold defect and those whose machines suffered from the 
control board failure.77 
 
B. The Northern District of Illinois rules on class certification; both 
parties appeal 
 
 The district court was asked to certify two separate classes: 
mold plaintiffs and control board plaintiffs.78 While finding no issue 
with certifying the control board plaintiffs’ class, the court carefully 
considered  the mold plaintiffs’ claims in light of the predominance 
requirement under Rule 23(b)(3).79  
 Recognizing that the plaintiffs claimed the mold problem stems 
from a common defect with the machines that renders them unable to 
clean themselves, the court noted that Sears had taken several remedial 
steps to fix the mold issue.80 Finding that neither the plaintiffs’ expert 
nor the plaintiffs’ themselves have accounted for how these remedial 
steps have impacted the mold growth in the machines, the court held 
that the issue is model dependent and not as pervasive as the plaintiffs 
allege.81 Thus, because the mold issues are model-specific and depend 
on Sears’ knowledge of ongoing issues with the machines, the court 
found that the common issues do not predominate over the common 
questions and denied certification.82 Notably, the court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ argument that the predominance inquiry employed requires 
an improper finding on the merits that is more appropriately left until 
after certification has been granted or denied.83 
                                                 
 77 Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., No. 06-cv-7023, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
157499, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. 2011).  
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at *14–16. 
 80 Id. at *16. 
 81 Id. at *17.  
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. (“The court notes that in the Seventh Circuit, preliminary inquiries into 
the facts and merits are appropriate in reviewing the predominance of common 
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C. The Seventh Circuit makes its initial ruling 
 
 The case first came before the Seventh Circuit on a Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(f) motion for an interlocutory appeal by 
both parties from the Northern District of Illinois’ decision to deny 
class certification as to the mold issue and to grant certification in part 
as to the defective control unit issue.84 The court’s determination 
centered on the predominance question under FRCP 23(b)(3) and 
looked to whether the district court incorrectly denied class 
certification as to the mold issue.85 The first issue was whether there 
was a common question concerning the predisposition of the machines 
to develop an odorous mold due to their design.86 The court found that, 
despite Sears’ claim that they sold twenty-seven different types of 
Kenmore machines over the period in question, only five of the 
various changes that Whirlpool, the machines’ manufacturer, made 
were related to the mold issue. Thus, the common question––whether 
the machines were defective in permitting the growth of mold––is 
common to all parties.87 The only issue requiring individual 
determination was the amount of damages owed.88 
 The second issue was whether the court had correctly granted 
class certification for the defective control unit claims. The crux of the 
complaint is that Sears knew about a defect during manufacture of the 
control boards yet continued to manufacture machines with defective 
boards and charge customers with defective machines hundreds of 
dollars to fix the defect.89 The court, again, found a common question 
in whether the control boards were indeed defective and that the only 
                                                                                                                   
issues for certification purposes.”) (citing Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 
F.3d 672, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2001)).  
 84 Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 702 F.3d 359, 361 (7th. Cir. 2013). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 363. 
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issue requiring individual determination was that of harm suffered by 
the class members.90 
 Finding that there were common questions among all class 
members, the court found that the claims predominated over the 
individual damages claims and were sufficient to warrant class 
certification with the caveat that the district court may wish to create 
subclasses depending on the specific model of washing machine or the 
state in which the class member resided to comply with state law.91 
The Seventh Circuit denied Sears’ petition to rehear the case en banc 
in December 2012.92 
 
D. Petition for Certiorari and the Supreme Court’s involvement 
 
 Following the Seventh Circuit’s decision, Sears petitioned the 
Supreme Court for certiorari.93 The Supreme Court in a memorandum 
opinion vacated the Seventh Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case 
for review in consideration of the Court’s recent decision in Comcast 
Corp. v. Behrend.94 
 
E. The Seventh Circuit’s rehearing on remand 
 
 The Seventh Circuit framed the issue on remand as an issue of 
law: “whether the Comcast decision cut the ground out from under our 
decision ordering that the two classes be certified.”95 With this in 
mind, Judge Posner, writing for the unanimous court, evaluated the 
implication that Comcast has on the court’s ruling in Sears I.96 Judge 
Posner argued that the Comcast holding is simply that “a damages suit 
                                                 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 362-63. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 2013 WL 
768586, (No. 12-1067). 
 94 Sears, Roebuck, and Co. v. Butler, 133 S. Ct. 2768 (mem.). 
 95 Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. II, 727 F.3d 796, 798 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 96 Id. at 799. 
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cannot be certified as a class action unless the damages sought are the 
result of classwide injury that the suit alleges.”97 Thus, the Court’s 
ultimate rule is that a damages model that does not identify damages 
that are the result of the wrong is insufficient to warrant class 
certification.98 
 Judge Posner applied this broadly: washing machine mold 
class members only seek damages attributable to mold while control 
unit class members only seek damages attributable to the control unit 
defect.99 He went on to distinguish this case factually from the 
Comcast decision. In Comcast, the district court attempted to 
determine damages on a classwide basis; not so in this case.100 Rule 
23(c)(4)101 permits the segregation of issues so that classes can move 
forward solely on the common issues that predominate while 
maintaining the individual issues unique to specific class members for 
separate resolution.102 
 Rejecting the damages determination as the rationale for the 
Court’s decision to remand, Judge Posner proceeded to the evidentiary 
requirements Comcast emphasized are necessary to prevent class 
litigation from proceeding where individual issues actually 
predominate.103  
 The court rejected Sears’ argument that the district court’s 
analysis was not sufficiently thorough to satisfy the Comcast 
requirement and holds that individual damages need not be identical 
across all class members to satisfy predominance.104 This standard, the 
                                                 
 97 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 800. 
 100 Id. 
 101 “Particular Issues. When appropriate, an action may be brought or 
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.” Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(c)(4). 
 102 Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. II, 727 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir. 2013). See 
also Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 Amendment of Rule 23(b)(3); Pella Corp. 
v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 393–94 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 103 Sears II, 727 F.3d at 800. 
 104 Id. at 801. 
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court argued, would effectively spell the death knell of class 
certification and is far afield from what the Supreme Court held in 
Comcast.105  
 The court concludes by reinstating its November 13, 2012, 
order granting class certification: 
 
 There is a single, central, common issue of 
liability: whether the Sears washing machine was 
defective. Two separate defects are alleged, but 
remember that this class action is really two class 
actions. In one the defect alleged involves mold, in the 
other the control unit. Each defect is central to liability. 
Complications arise from the design changes and from 
separate state warranty laws, but can be handled by the 
creation of subclasses.106 
 
Sears subsequently petitioned for, and was denied certiorari.107 
 
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY NARROWED THE APPLICABILITY 
OF COMCAST TO CLASSES SEEKING CLASSWIDE DAMAGES 
 
A. A brief analysis of the Seventh Circuit’s Post-
Comcast Predominance Jurisprudence 
 
 To understand the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Comcast 
v. Behrend, it is necessary to look at how the court has interpreted 
predominance in three recent decisions: Sears II; Parko v. Shell Oil 
Co.;108 and Ira Holtzman, C.P.A. & Assocs. V. Turza.109 In each of 
these cases, the Seventh Circuit was faced with determining whether 
the district court below had correctly ruled on whether the common 
                                                 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 801–02. 
 107 Sears, Roebuck, and Co. v. Butler, 2014 WL 684064 (2014). 
 108 739 F.3d 1083 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 109 728 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2013).  
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issues predominated over the class. These rulings establish the 
contours of the Seventh Circuit’s predominance jurisprudence 
following Comcast. 
 In each case, the court applies the same rule from Comcast 
regarding the necessity of a damages model to fit the theory of 
liability. In Sears II, the court distinguished between the classes here 
and the class in Comcast on both factual and legal grounds.110 
Interestingly, while holding that predominance requires a review of the 
merits, the Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the notion that “a class 
action limited to determining liability on a classwide basis, with 
separate hearings to determine . . . the damages of the individual class 
members” does not satisfy predominance.111 This is contrary to the 
Comcast ruling where Justice Scalia implicitly rejected the notion that 
a class should be granted Rule 23(b)(3) certification where damages 
have to be calculated individually.112 
  In Sears II, Judge Posner maneuvered around this point of 
contention by focusing on factual and procedural distinctions between 
the cases. Judge Posner relied on two basic distinctions. First, the 
plaintiffs in Comcast “fail[ed] to base all the damages they sought on 
the . . . injury of which the plaintiffs were complaining,” which was 
not so in Sears II.  Second, the district court in Sears II was not asked 
to determine damages on a classwide basis, unlike Comcast.113 
 The Seventh Circuit’s conclusion is clear when viewed through 
the lens of the other two, much more clear-cut, cases mentioned above.  
 In Ira Holtzman, the court determined the validity of a district 
court’s granting of class certification to a class of plaintiffs who had 
received fax-based solicitation in violation of the Telephone Consumer 
                                                 
 110 Sears II, 727 F.3d at 800.  
 111 Id. 
 112 Justice Scalia foreclosed the notion, and the dissent spent significant time 
arguing against the idea, that a class action could proceed without a method for 
determining classwide liability by reversing the decision of the lower courts instead 
of simply holding the damages model as insufficient to base classwide adjudication 
of the antitrust impact.  
 113 Sears II, 727 F.3d at 800.  
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Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227.114 Deciding that the Comcast 
case was inapposite to the facts at issue, the court pointed to the 
statutory remedy that allows easily calculable damages for each 
member of the plaintiff class.115 The court concluded that an easily 
calculable remedy, such as the statutorily available remedy available 
to the class members here, was completely distinguishable from the 
facts in Comcast.116 While in Comcast, the majority feared that 
individual calculation of damages would subsume the common 
issues,117 here there is no fear that the common questions of law or fact 
would not predominate over individual determination of damages.118  
 Importantly, the damages available are not simply a matter of 
dividing a pot of money among all of the class members; rather, the 
class members would all have to prove they have actually received the 
faxes at issue.119 Once the court determined the receipt of the faxes 
and the number received, the calculation of damages would simply be 
the product of the number of faxes received and the statutory damages 
permitted.120 Because the calculation of damages, though needing 
individual determination, would require nothing more than multiplying 
the number of faxes received by the amount of statutory damages 
available, the defendant’s liability to the group as a whole easily 
predominated over individual issues.121 
 Finally, in Parko v. Shell Oil Co. decided in January 2014, the 
Seventh Circuit, for the first time since Comcast, rejected class 
certification based on the district court’s improper finding of 
predominance.122 Here, the plaintiffs sought class certification to 
pursue claims against various defendants for allegedly leaking 
                                                 
 114 Id. at 683. 
 115 Id. at 684. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Comcast v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013). 
 118 Ira Holtzman, C.P.A., & Assocs. v. Turza, 728 F.3d 682, 684 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Parko v. Shell Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083, 1084 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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“benzene and other contaminants into the groundwater under the class 
members’ homes.”123 The Seventh Circuit rejected class certification, 
finding that the plaintiffs had not met their burden to prove that 
common questions would predominate over the class because a 
determination of liability and damages would require individual, rather 
than classwide evaluation.124 The court found that even assuming the 
plaintiffs could survive the threshold Rule 23(a) requirements, 
damages would have to be determined individually based on the 
diminution in property value each class member has suffered.125 The 
court further pointed to the inability of the residents to exclude any 
other cause for the loss in property value or to even fix causation on 
the alleged groundwater contamination.126  
 Taking these cases together, the Seventh Circuit has clearly 
defined the predominance inquiry in the post-Comcast world. With 
Sears II and Holtzman, the court has defined the two areas where 
classes will be able to achieve class certification under FRCP 23(b)(3): 
1) where the class bifurcates the damages question from liability such 
as in Sears II; and 2) where the class seeks determination of classwide 
damages but damages are susceptible to such a determination, such as 
in Holtzman. On the other side of the coin, the court defined when 
classes will not achieve class certification through Parko: where the 
determination of damages requires individualized inquiry into the 
harm caused by the defendants.  
 These cases provide district courts with a clear picture of what 
putative classes should be granted certification and which would run 
afoul of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Comcast. Indeed, the Northern 
District of Illinois and the Northern District of Indiana have already 
taken up the question of whether class certification is appropriate 
based on the Court’s decision in Comcast. In seven district court cases, 
                                                 
 123 Id. at 1084. 
 124 Id. at 1087. 
 125 Id. at 1086.  
 126 Id. 
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only two putative classes failed to achieve class certification.127 The 
rest of the cases relied on a broad reading of the Seventh Circuit’s 
analysis in Sears II and distinguished the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
on the facts of Comcast.128 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion Properly Applied 
Comcast to Plaintiffs Seeking Class Certification 
 
 Numerous scholars predicted the Comcast decision would 
result in a reduction of courts granting class certification.129 While it is 
                                                 
 127 Tamas v. Family Video Movie Club, Inc., No. 11 C 1024, 2013 WL 
4080649, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Harris v. Reliable Reports, Inc., No. 1:13–CV–210 
JVB, 2014 WL 931070, at *9 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (“[I]t would be premature to strike 
Harris’s class . . . when no discovery has been undertaken.”).  
 128 Fox v. Riverview Realty Partners, No. 12 C 9350, 2014 WL 1613022, at *6 
(N.D. Ill. 2014) (relying on a class of only 100 members (compared to the two 
million members of the Comcast case) and a “mechanical” damages calculation); 
Kurgan v. Chiro One Wellness Centers LCC, Case No. 10–cv–1899, 2014 WL 
642092, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (relying on the statutory structure of the Illinois 
Minimum Wage Law to find that adjudication of liability would “aid in resolving 
damages” and the manageability of their determination); Reliable Reports, 2014 WL 
931070, at *9 (relying on Espenscheid v. Directsat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 776 
(7th Cir. 2013) for the proposition that “the district court must carefully explore the 
possible ways of overcoming problems in calculating individual damages.”); Driver 
v. AppleIllinois, LLC, Case No. 06 C 6149, 2013 WL 5818899, at *11–12 (N.D. Ill. 
2013) (“Applying Comcast as expansively as Smith suggests would virtually 
prohibit class certification in wage and hour cases . . . There is no indication 
in Comcast that the Court intended to undo the 67 years of decisions setting FLSA 
damages under the burden-shifting framework of Mt. Clemens.”); Healey v. Int’l 
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 134, 296 F.R.D. 587, 594–95 (N.D. Ill. 
2013) (distinguishing Comcast on the fact that this case only has forty class 
members and that some damages-related issues are common to the class); Tamas, 
2013 WL 4080649 at *9 (finding that plaintiffs had not sufficiently proven that the 
liability issues predominated); Harris v. comScore, Inc., 292 F.R.D. 579, 589 (N.D. 
Ill. 2013) (“[I]ndividual factual damages issues do not provide a reason to deny class 
certification when the harm to each plaintiff is too small to justify resolving the suits 
individually.”). 
 129 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 23, at 480; Ellen Meriwether, Comcast 
Corp. v. Behrend: Game Changing or Business as Usual?, 27-SUM ANTITRUST 57, 
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likely too soon to tell whether the doom-and-gloom future for class 
actions will come to fruition, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Sears II 
keeps that concern at bay.  
 First, if we look at the Seventh Circuit’s predominance 
jurisprudence before the High Court handed down its opinion in 
Comcast, it is apparent that very little, if anything, has changed.130 In 
Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, the Seventh Circuit recognized in 
the (b)(3) context that where calculation of damages is “mechanical, 
formulaic, a task not for a trier of fact but for a computer program” the 
court need not deny class certification.131 Similarly, in Messner v. 
Northshore University Health System, the Seventh Circuit vacated and 
remanded a district court’s denial of class certification for a putative 
(b)(3) class of antitrust plaintiffs.132 In a case very similar to the facts 
of Comcast, the Seventh Circuit held that proof of “uniformity of price 
increases” was a bridge too far to achieve class certification.133 
                                                                                                                   
57 (2013) (“[W]hile the holding of the case within its factual context provides little 
support for a conclusion that the decision has significantly altered the class 
certification landscape, certain of the Court's comments may provide fodder for 
defense arguments that plaintiffs must offer a damages model capable of proving 
damages for individual class members.”); Klonoff, supra note 3, at 799–800 (“It 
remains to be seen whether Comcast will now cause lower courts to depart from the 
traditional rule that individualized damages issues normally do not defeat class 
certification. Courts and commentators are already divided on what the impact of the 
case will be.”); Campos, supra note 48. 
 130 See, e.g., Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 773 (7th Cir. 
2013) (decided one month before Comcast); Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 
394 (7th Cir. 2010) (three years before Comcast); Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 
801 (7th Cir. 2008) (five years before Comcast). 
 131 705 F.3d at 773.  
 132 669 F.3d 802, 819 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 133 Id. This case is an interesting counterexample to Comcast and is worth 
much greater consideration on its own merits. Suffice it to say, the case is factually 
distinguishable from Comcast on the basic point that defendants did not challenge 
the congruity of the injury alleged with the damages sought, only that the damages 
would require individual calculation. In this way, Messner is very much like the 
Holtzman case discussed supra where uniformity of damages is not necessary to 
satisfy the predominance inquiry. See Ira Holtzman, C.P.A. & Assocs. v. Turza, 728 
F.3d 682, 684 (7th Cir. 2013).  
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Further, the court upheld certification for a bifurcated trial where 
individual trials would be held to determine causation and damages for 
each class member while the court would determine the common issue 
of defect in certain models of Pella windows.134 Finally, the court 
noted the flexibility district courts have with class certification when it 
held that despite variances in each class member’s personal damages, 
“judges can devise solutions to address that problem if there are 
substantial common issues that outweigh the single variable of 
damages amounts.”135 
 Thus, the Seventh Circuit has correctly not changed the tune 
that “Rule 23 allows district courts to devise imaginative solutions to 
problems created by the presence . . . of individual damages issues.”136 
The court will continue to grant class certification where damages are 
not subject to classwide determination. Instead of foregoing 23(b)(3) 
classes or creating an increased barrier to entry, the court relied on the 
mechanism in Rule 23(c)(4) to limit classes to liability, while 
reserving individual determination of damages for a later day. 
 The Seventh Circuit’s conclusion plainly fits within the 
limiting language both the dissent and the majority employed in their 
respective opinions.137 Comcast has truly broken no new ground for 
classes seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(3), both in the Seventh 
Circuit and for each circuit to have considered the issue. For example 
the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits all held, following Comcast, that 
bifurcation of the liability and damages questions renders the Comcast 
ruling inapplicable.138 Further, the Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits 
                                                 
 134 Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 135 Arreola, 546 F.3d at 801. 
 136 Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 137 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013) (“We start with an 
unremarkable premise. If respondents prevail on their claims, they would be entitled 
only to damages resulting from reduced overbuilder competition.”). Id. at 1436 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he opinion breaks no new ground on the standard for 
certifying a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).”).  
 138 See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 817 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he rule of Comcast is largely irrelevant where 
determinations of liability and damages have been bifurcated in accordance with 
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agree that predominance may still be satisfied where individual 
calculations of damages are necessary.139 Only two circuits, the Eighth 
and the Eleventh, have considered predominance without applying 
Comcast to the facts; both courts denied certification because the 
plaintiffs could not successfully prove any common issue 
predominated.140 
 In short, the Seventh Circuit has considerable support in 
refusing to depart from the common understanding that “individual 
damages calculations do not preclude class certification under Rule 
23(b)(3).141 Despite the concerns of academics and commentators, and 
the current Supreme Court trend to heighten class action prerequisites, 
the Seventh Circuit has put Comcast Corp. v. Behrend in its rightful 
place: the case clarifies the district court’s need to investigate the 
merits of class certification and to require congruence between the 
                                                                                                                   
Rule 23(c)(4).”); Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d 838, 860 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“Where determinations on liability and damages 
have been bifurcated . . . the decision in Comcast . . . has limited application.”); 
Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v. XTO Energy, Inc., 725 F.3d 1213, 
1220 (10th Cir. 2013) (noting that individualized damages do not destroy class 
certification where a class may be certified for liability purposes only and leaving 
damages for individual proceedings). 
 139 See Catholic Health Care West v. U.S. Foodserv., 729 F.3d 108, 122 (2d 
Cir. 2013) (“[B]ecause the question whether the invoices materially misrepresented 
the amounts due to [defendant] is common to all plaintiffs, the class will prevail or 
fail in unison on this point––rendering certification appropriate.”); Leyva v. Medline 
Indus., 716 F.3d 510, 513–14 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he presence of individualized 
damages cannot, by itself, defeat class certification.”); In re Rail Freight Fuel 
Surcharge Antitrust Litigation, 725 F.3d 244, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (common 
evidence must show all the class members were actually harmed by the alleged 
wrongdoing, but not necessarily the amount of damages incurred). 
 140 Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773, 779 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(rejecting class certification where questions of liability would require individual 
inquiries and “will predominate over whether Auto-Owners’s process was 
reasonable and overwhelm questions common to the class.”); Bussey v. Macon 
County Greyhound Park, Inc., No. 13–12733, ___ Fed.Appx. ____, 2014 WL 
1302658, at *6 (11th Cir. 2014) (reversing the district court’s grant of class 
certification for failure to conduct a “rigorous analysis”). 
 141 Comcast, 133 S.Ct. at 1437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
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 What we can take away from the Seventh Circuit’s 
jurisprudence is that not much has changed, as the Comcast dissent 
correctly predicted.142 When the Supreme Court decided Comcast in 
2013, an overwhelming majority of scholars predicted that Rule 23 
had been forever altered. Professor John Campbell, at the University 
of Denver, predicted that “many meritorious claims will either never 
get started, die on the vine, or, even if they do succeed, provide relief 
to a more narrowly drawn class.”143 Others have similarly chimed in, 
fretting over the future of class action litigation.144  
 The Court, perhaps unintentionally, provided myriad reasons 
for these prognosticators to wring their hands. Not the least of which 
was changing the question presented after the parties had briefed the 
issues, rejecting the prêt à porter145 Daubert issue in exchange for the 
unchallenged predominance question.146 If these commentators had 
stepped back from the decision for a moment, they would have 
understood the narrowness of Justice Scalia’s opinion. Most notably, 
the Court made no attempt to backpedal from Amchem Products v. 
Windsor, nor does the Court attempt to establish any new rule of law. 
Despite the bend-over-backwards approach the Court used to reach 
this question,147 Comcast’s biggest contribution to the predominance 
jurisprudence is clarification of certain principles already generally 
accepted in the circuit and district courts.148  
                                                 
 142 Id. at 1436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 143 Campbell, supra note 23, at 480. 
 144 See, e.g., Meriwether, supra 129, at 57; Klonoff, supra note 3, at 799–800. 
145 Ready to wear. 
 146 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 147 It would make sense if the Court reached to address this question.  
 148 Including the requirement of the district court to “look beyond the 
pleadings” to perform a rigorous analysis to determine whether class certification 
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 And the Seventh Circuit agrees.  
 Through the Sears II decision, the court makes clear that the 
predominance requirements have not meaningfully changed with the 
Comcast decision. Had Comcast meant what the commentators had 
predicted, the Seventh Circuit could have relied on the district court’s 
reasoning and held that common proof of damages for class members 
is required and rejected certification.149 Plainly, the Seventh Circuit 
refused to do so. 
 Moreover, the reasoning in Sears II is consistently applied 
through the court’s decisions in Holtzman and Palko, indicating that 
the Sears II conclusion is not an aberration. Finally, the decisions of 
the district courts within the Seventh Circuit and the other circuit 
courts strengthen the weight of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion. There 
does not seem to be a court within the Seventh Circuit, district or 
circuit, nor a circuit court in the country that agrees with the doom-
and-gloom outlook peddled in early 2013.  
 Moving forward, the question will be to what degree the 
Supreme Court is satisfied with the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning. The 
Court’s denial of certiorari for Sears II suggests that the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision is in line with what Justice Scalia advocated. Yet the 
recent history of the Supreme Court’s Rule 23 jurisprudence intimates 
otherwise. Thus, one must ask, will the Supreme Court fall in line with 
its decisions in Walmart and AT&T Mobility to further constrain 
consumers rights under Rule 23? Or does the Court’s decision in 
Comcast mark a degree of satisfaction with where class action law 
stands today? Sears II may well be the key to answering that question.  
 
                                                                                                                   
should be granted; the need for common issues to predominate over individual 
issues; and that common liability issues cannot predominate where damages for over 
two million class members would have to have damages calculated individually. See 
generally id. (majority opinion). 
 149 Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. II, 727 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013).  
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